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courts to include such a theory.6 Furthermore, it cannot be con-
tended that this relation back, although a device for avoiding the
statute of limitations, does not produce a beneficial result, especially
when viewed in light of the notice to the defendant in the original
pleadings of the facts upon which the wrongful death action is based.
Since the defendant must have been apprised of the occurrences
upon which the new cause of action is based, the mere addition
of a new legal theory for recovery cannot prejudice him and, there-
fore, the wrongful death action should be allowed to relate back
to the commencement of the original personal injury action.
However, there is still another issue that must be discussed in
relation to the disposition of this case. CPLR 218(a) provides that
"nothing in this article shall authorize any action to be commenced
which is barred when this article becomes effective. . . ." In the
principal case decedent's death occurred on December 5, 1960.
The statute of limitations for wrongful death expired on December
5, 1962, prior to the effective date of the CPLR. At first glance,
the relation back theory as applied by this court falls squarely
within the limits of this provision, thereby precluding the relief
afforded by this case. It should be noted that this section was
apparently not called to the attention of this court, so that judicial
reflection on this point is not available.
This section, however, is amenable to conflicting interpretations,
one possibly consistent with this case. Primarily the statute deals
with an "action to be commenced" and since the executor merely
sought to enlarge an already pending action it could be argued
that no new action was commenced within the strict wording of the
statute.
Contrariwise, it is apparent that no initial action for wrongful
death could have been commenced, indicating that plaintiff should
not be able to circumvent the purpose of the statute, i.e., to prevent
the commencement of any cause of action which is barred at the
effective date of the CPLR. Wrongful death is obviously a separate
cause of action and it appears that the purpose of CPLR 218(a)
was to bar just such an enlargement as perfected here, although
it was not technically the commencement of an action.
General Municipal Law Section 50-e.: Motion to file late notice of
claim denied where city's ownership of property not discovered
by usual search.
In Thomson v. City of New York,1 the plaintiff sought per-
mission to file a late notice of claim. The plaintiff contended that
6Beach v. Grollman, 169 F. Supp. 612 (E.D. Pa. 1959); Denver & Rio
Grande W.R.R. v. Clint 235 F.2d 445 (10th Cir. 1956); 3 Mooaz, FEDERAL
PRAcTICE § 15.15 (1964).
724 App. Div. 2d 4?7, 260 N.Y.S.2d 667 (1st Dep't 1965).
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he was unable to discover the city's ownership of land upon which
he was injured, since title was procured through a condemnation
proceeding which the "usuar' search would not reveal." In spite
of the plaintiff's apparent diligence, the court correctly refused
to permit an extension, reiterating the specific language of the statute
which permits an extension only in the following cases: where the
claimant is an infant, or physically incapacitated, or incompetent,
and by reason of such disability fails to file; where the claimant
dies within the filing period; and where the claimant fails to file
because of reliance on written settlement representations.'
The harshness of such a result indicates the need for additional
discretion in the courts to provide some outlet for the diligent
plaintiff where no prejudice to the city is shown '10 or where the
filing is not unreasonably late. It may be contended that a more
thorough search by the plaintiff would have resulted in discovery
of the city's ownership since a lis pendens was filed as part of the
condemnation proceeding. However, should such a degree of dili-
gence be required where the loss is so complete and the time for
filing so short? This problem is especially distressing where there
is neither a showing of negligence on the plaintiff's part nor prejudice
to the city.
ARTICLE 3-JURISDICTION AND SERVICE, APPEARANCE AND
CHOICE OF COURT
CPLR 302: No basis for jurisdiction over defendant who was
domiciliary at time act complained of was committed.
CPLR 302 vests the New York courts with wide powers of
jurisdiction over non-domiciliary defendants served with process
outside the state." The problem has arisen, however, as to whether
the statute is limited to defendants who are non-domiciliaries not
S Id. at 427, 260 N.Y.S2d at 668.
9 N.Y. MuNIc. LAW § 50-e 5. See, e.g., Franco v. City of New York,
270 App. Div. 1050, 63 N.Y.S.2d 291 (2d Dep't 1946) (physical incapacity);
Oliveras v. New York City Trans. Auth., 27 Misc. 2d 711, 207 N.Y.S.2d
313 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1960) (infancy); Newman v. City of Geneva,
2 Misc. 2d 646, 153 N.Y.S.2d 677 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1956) (settlement
representations); Krauss v. Board of Educ., 199 Misc. 505, 103 N.Y.S.2d
939 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1951) (infancy).
20 Kaiser v. Town of Sauna, 20 App. Div. 2d 312, 315, 247 N.Y.S.2d 9, 12
(4th Dep't 1964).
11 CPLR 302(a): "A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over any
non-domiciliary . . . as to a cause of action arising from any of the acts
enumerated in this section . . . if, in person or through an agent, he:
1. transacts any business within the state; or
2. commits a tortious act within the state ... ; or
3. owns, uses or possesses any real property situated within the
state."
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